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Oct. 1968] CLARK v. DZIABAS 449 
[69 C.2d 449; 71 Cal.Rptr. 901. 445 P.2d 5171 
[L. A. No. 29569. In Bank. Oct. 7, 1968.] 
HERBERT LEE CLARK et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. BODO DZIABAS, Defendant and Respondent. 
[1] Automobiles-Operation-Care-Defects in Brakes: Defenses: 
Burden of Proof-Negligence-Violation of Regulations.-The 
duty of the owner and operator of an automobile to maintain 
its brakes in compliance with Veh. Code, §§ 26453, 26454, is 
nondelegable, and to establish a defense to liability for 
damages caused by a brake failure, the owner and operator 
must establish not only that he did what might reasonahly be 
expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under simi-
Jar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law, but 
also that the failure was not due to the negligence of any 
agent, whether employee or independent contractor, employed 
by him to inspect or repair the brakes. 
[2] Id.-Operation-Care-Defects in Brakes: Sufficiency of Evi-
dence-Defective Equipment.-In an action for damages in-
eurred in an automobile accident caused by a brake failure on 
defendant's used car, which he had purchased a year earlier, 
the evidence failed to support the judgment for defendant 
where defendant had a nondelegable duty to maintain his 
brakes in good working order, and where, although he had 
rebutted the presumption of his own direct negligence, the 
evidence had established neither the negligence nor the 
absence of negligence of either or both of the two independent 
contractors he had engaged to overhaul and inspect the brake 
system before the accident. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Laurence J. Ritten-
band, Judge. Order affirmed; judgment reversed. 
Action to recover damages for injuries to persons and prop-
erty incurred in an automobile accident. Judgment for defend-
ant reversed. 
[1] Automobiles: effect of defective brakes on liability for 
injury, note, 14 A.L.R. 1339, 63 A.L.R. 398, 170 A.L.R. 611. See 
also, Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Automobiles, §§ 190, 191; Am.Jur.2d, Auto-
mobiles and Highway Traffic, § 351. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles and Other Road Ve-
hicles, §§ 108 (2), 177, 197; [2] Automobiles and Other Road Ve-




450 CLARK v. DZIABAS [69 C.2d 
N. E. Youngp]ood and Samuel Schekman for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
Edward I. Pollock, Robert E. Cartwright, Theodore A. 
Horn, Robert G. Beloud, Leo M. O'Connor and Leonard Sacks 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
Betts & I~oomis and Richard F. Runkle for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Herbert Lee 
Clark brought this action to recover damages for injuries to 
their persons and property incurred in an automobile acci-
dent. They appeal from an adverse judgment and from an 
order denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict on the issue of liability. 
Mr. Clark was driving and Mrs. Clark was riding in the 
right front seat at the time of the accident. They had stopped 
at an intersection to wait for the traffic signal to change when 
defendant's car struck their car from the rear. 
pefendant testified that his brakes failed when he stepped 
on his brake pedal in response to the traffic signal and plain-
tiffs' St9PpiIig ahead of him. He swerved to the right but was 
unable to ·avoid a collision. He had no reason to know that his 
brakes were defective until they failed. The failure was --
caused by. a rupture in a hydraulic line that gave defendant 
no warning of its impending occurrence. About six months 
before the accident he had the brakes overhauled by the auto-
mobile agency that had sold him the car, then a 3-year-old 
used car, about a year before the accident. About five weeks 
before the accident, defendant asked the attendants at the 
service station that regularly serviced his car to inspect the 
brakes, and there is evidence that they were adjusted at that 
time. 
One of defendant's expert witnesses testified that the rup-
ture in the hydraulic line was caused by the rubbing of a 
shock absorber against the line at a place where it had previ-
ously been repaired by soldering. Another of defendant's 
expert witnesses testified that the soldering was "very ama-
teurish" and that the line would inevitably leak and eventu-
ally fail. There WE-S no evidence of who had soldered the line, 
when it had been soldered, or whether or not the defective 
soldering or the rubbing by the shock absorber would have 
been detected by a reasonable inspection . 
,j .•. 
Oct. 1968] CLARK v. DZlABAS 451 
[69 C.2d 449; 71 Cal.Rptr. 801. 445 P.2d 5171 
[1] In Maloney v. Rath, S.F. 22596, ante, p. 442 [71 
Cal.Rptr. 897, 445 P.2d 513], we held that the duty of the 
owner and operator of an automobile to maintain its brakes in 
compliance with the provisions of the Vehicle Code (Veh. 
Code, §§ 26453, 26454) is nondelegable. Accordingly, to estab-
lish a defense to liability for damages caused by a brake fail-
ure, the owner and operator m'ust establish 110t only that" 'he 
did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordi-
nary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who de-
sired to comply with the law'" (Maloney v. RatTt, supra, 
ante, p. 444) but also that the failure was not owing to the 
negligence of any agent, whether employee or independent 
contractor, employed by him to inspect or repair the brakes. 
[2] In the present case there is no evidence that either or 
both of the two independent contractors employed by defend-
ant exercised reasonable care in repairing and inspecting thc 
brakes. Either one may have been responsible for the defective 
soldering and both may have been negJigent in failing to 
detect the defect while inspecting the brakes. Accordingly, the 
evidence does not support the:judgment, and it must therefore 
be reversed. . 
The specific failure of proof, however, was not called to 
defendant's attention at the time plaintiffs moved for a 
"'-directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict. Moreover, unlike Maloney v. Ralh, supra, the record does 
not establish that either of defendant's independent contrac-
tors was negligent. Accordingly, defendant should be afforded 
. an opportunity to prove, if he can, that the defective condi-
. tion of the brakes that led to their ultimate failure existed 
before he purchased the car and would not have been discov-
ered by a reasonable inspection thereafter. Such proof would 
establish that neither defendant nor the agents he employed 
to maintain his brakes were negligent and that therefore his 
nondelegable duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain his 
brakes was not violated. 
Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court errcd in instruct-
ing the jury on alternative theories of liability. They contend 
that in addition to the brake failure, defendant's followillg 
too close and his failure to use all available means to avoid the 
accident after his brakes failed were concurrent proximate 
causes of the accident for which the jury could find defendant 
liable whether or not it concluded that the brake failure was 
excused. They assert that the instructions confused the vari-












erroneously concluded that a finding that the brake failure 
was excused would also preclude holding defendant liable on 
any other theory. Since the judgment must be reversed in any 
event, it is unnecessary to consider whether or not any possi-
ble confusion in the instructions constituted prejudicial error. 
Moreover, since the problem has now been thoroughly exposed, 
the parties should have no difficulty in proposing appropriate 
modifications of the instructions on retrial to obviate any like-
lihood of confusion. 
The order denying the motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict is affirmed, and the judgment is reversed. 
Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, 
J., concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment for 
the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Frampton in the opinion 
prepared by him for the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Three (Clark v. Dziabas, 2 Civ. 30945, filed 
February 29,1968, certified for nonpublication). 
